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PRESIDENT HARMAN -- THAT SOUNDS
PRETTY GOOD, DOESN'T IT?.......
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Let me try to discuss the implications of the European Security
architecture of what Wolfgang Ischinger just addressed namely the problem of
the relation of Russia to the West and Ukraine. What we are seeing in Ukraine, in my
judgement, is not a peak but a symptom of a more basic problem, namely the
gradual but steady emergence in Russia of over the last six or seven years of
a quasi-mystical chauvinism. Putin has taken the lead in this. and it has a
great deal of content that is significant for the totality of Russia's
relations with the world and the west in particular.
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Recently, The Russian international affairs council, an institution
in Moscow composed of very reputable & significant scholars, not
dissidents, but independent thinkers, and these do exist these days in
Moscow, has come up with a report on Russia’s national identity
transformation and new foreign policy doctrine, and it reports in some detail
on the process of creating a wholly new conceptual framework for defining
Russia's relationship with the world. A relationship that the Russians feel
is needed because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the partial
disintegration of the long-established Russian empire.
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It is a longish report but it is worth reading for those who are
interested in international affairs. It deals with particularly several key
concepts that this new view of the world contains. A view of the world created by the need to
Russians around Putin and Putin himself have felt for a more comprehensive
interpretation of what is the nature
of Russia's position in the world and its relationship with the world and the
West in particular.
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And it is in this context, that the Ukrainian issue becomes
significant. The key concepts of it,
this report, written by a group of people of some prominence in Moscow,
involves four basic concepts. That of, and I quote, a divided people.
Secondly, the theme, quote, of protecting compatriots abroad, end quote. then
more broadly, the Russian world, Russky mir, in Russian, and the importance
of acknowledging and sustaining, embracing and promoting, quote, the great
Russian civilization.
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I mention this because I
think it would be an error to think that Crimea and Ukraine are just the
products of a sudden outrage. They are to some extent in terms of timing.
It would have been much smarter for Russia to have what has been
happening, happen about ten years from now when Russia would be stronger,
economically more solid. But it
happened. And these concepts are important. A divided people is the point of
departure for the chauvinistic claim that Russia's sovereignty embraces all
Russians. wherever they are.
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And that has, of protecting compatriots aboard. And that has special
meaning for those countries which do have Russian ethnic nationals living in
their society and border Russia.
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The divided people and the protecting of compatriots aboard then
raises the question of the Russian world.
The notion here is of organic, integral unity between all Russians
irrespective of their territorial location. And the territorial location can
be altered favourably in reuniting the Russian people. Think of the Baltic States.
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And last not least, the conviction that Russia is not part of the
western civilization. Is also not a
part of China. It is not part of the
Moslem world. Russia itself is a great
civilization, a world civilization which emphasizes a set of principles, some
of which are not unfamiliar to our own society, such as for example, strong
commitment to a particular religion, but much stronger than in the West,
where religion is part of a more complex social arrangement.
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The notion that the great Russian civilisation stands for certain
basic values, not on a religious, but in terms of interpersonal
relationships, to some extent. For
example condemning some of the changes in the relationship between the sexes,
and within the sexes that are now taking place in the world.
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In effect, Russia protects the integrity of certain basic beliefs
that have characterised Christianity, but in the Russian view, Christianity
is now betraying or permitting to slip away.
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So this is a comprehensive outlook. And an ambitious outlook which
justifies the conclusion that Russia is a world power. And nothing has hurt
Putin lately, in some of the international dialogue with the West, than the
words of President Obama which credited Russia with being a significant
regional power. He didn't have to say more to score a point that hurt.
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That is therefore an important point of departure for dealing with
the Ukraine issue.
The Ukraine issue is not a sudden peak but a symptom as I’ve said of
a basic problem. The emergence of the policies packaged within the larger
philosophical framework, which I've described.
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00:2?:00
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What can we, therefore, expect if Ukraine, in fact is its
manifestation, that problem will be difficult to resolve. And I think it will take time to
resolve. But of course, resolution of
it need not be a unilateral solution if the West has a stake in it. And the
stake has to be, then, crystallized into meaningful policy. The Ukraine
problem may fade if it is contained. And especially if the Russian
increasingly cosmopolitan middle class which is surfacing, but not dominant
currently, becomes politically more important, perhaps repelled by its sense
of vulnerability and disappointment in Putin, and at some point assumes a
more significant political role when Putin has passed from the stage. But
when? There's no way of predicting it. It could be soon. It could be a long
time. But
A great deal depends on whether what Ukraine has become as a symptom
becomes a success or a failure from Putin’s point of view. So in brief the
stakes are significant.In the most immediate sense, the stakes involves, of
course, the issue
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00:27:00
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that the use of force in Crimea and the ongoing and sustained effort
to destabilize parts of Ukraine pose as a threat to the post-world War II
notions of international arrangements, and particularly the exclusion of the
use of force in resolving territorial issues. That has been a cardinal
assumption of the European order after world war II. And Russia has been part
of it, including the treaties that it has signed. But now it is challenging
that. That is a significant threat in a broad sense and in an immediate
threat psychogically, at least, that potentially, in view of Crimea,
militarily to the Baltic States, to Georgia, to Moldova, and more vaguely,
indirectly, but perhaps potentially more successful than the others, Belarus.
Because Belarus does not have any external protection. The others that I have
mentioned do have in varying degrees.
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00:28:00
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It follows from what I am saying, that the Ukrainian problem is a
challenge, that the West, by which I mean, the US and Europe & NATO
particularly must address on 3 levels. We have to effectively deter the
temptation facing the Russian leadership regarding the use of force. We have
to deter the use of force more simply put.
We have to secondly to obtain the termination of Russia's deliberate
efforts at the progressive or continuing destabilization of parts of Ukraine.
It's very hard to judge how ambitious these goals are. but it is not an
accident that in that 1 single portion in which the Russians actually
predominate, one single portion of Ukraine in which they actually predominate
the use of force has been sophisticated, in that the participants in the
effort, were armed, even tanks.
Certainly, effective anti-aircraft weaponry.
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All of that is something that even, uh, disagreeable, disaffected
citizens of a country to which that they feel that they do not belong, would
storing somewhere in their attic or basement.
These are weapons provided in effect for the purpose of shaping
formations that are capable of sustaining serious military engagements.
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It is a form of inter-state
aggression. You can’t call it anything else. How would we feel if all of the
sudden there was, say, the drug orientated gangs in the US, were armed from
abroad, from our southern neighbour, by (buy) equipment which would permit
violence on that scale on a continuing basis. So this is a serious challenge.
So that is the second objective.
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And the 3rd objective to promote and then discuss with the
Russians, a formula for an eventual compromise, assuming that in the 1st
instance, that the use of force openly and on a large scale is deterred and
the effort destabilized is abandoned.
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That means in turn the following: and I will quite blunt regarding my
own views on this subject. Ukraine has
to be supported, if it is to resist. If Ukraine doesn’t resist, if its
internal disorder persisted, in its
capacity to organise effective national defense, doesn’t transpire then
the Ukraine problem will be resolved unilaterally but with consequential
effects, that would destabilising in regards to the vulnerable states &
to the totality of the East-West relations, for the forces of chauvinism, for
forces of a new sort of world self-definition will become more strident. And
they do represent the most negative aspects of contemporary Russian society.
A kind of thirst for nationalism, of fulfilment, gratification of the
exercise of power. Something which is
not pervasive in the new middle-class, which is the long range alternative,
but which is certainly not on top of political influence.
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If Ukraine has to be supported, the Ukrainians have to know that the
West is prepared to help them resist.
There is no reason to be secret about it, it would be much better if
we were open about it. And to say to the Ukrainians and to those who may
threaten Ukraine, that if you resist, you Ukrainians resist, you will have
weapons, and we will provide some of those weapons in advance of the very act
of invasion. Because in the absence of
that, the temptation to invade & pre-empt become overwhelming.
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But what kind of weapons is important. And in my view, these should
be weapons designed particularly to permit the Ukrainians to engage in
effective urban warfare, in resistance.
There is no point in trying to arm the Ukrainians to take on the
Russian army in the open field. Thousands of tanks, a modern army for some
purposes, overwhelming forces. But
there is a history to be learnt from urban resistance in WW II & more
recently in Grozny, Chechenia, which resisted for 3 months in house to house
fighting. There are some moving
examples from WWII which I do not need to
reiterate.
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The point is, if the effort to invade was to be successful
politically, it would have to incorporate major cities, such as Kharkiv, Kiev
were to resist, and street fighting became an necessity, it would be
prolonged & costly. The fact of the matter is and this is where the
timing of the whole crisis is important.
Russia is not yet ready to undertakethat that kind of effort. It would be too costly in blood, and it
would be paralysingly costly in finances & it would take a long time and
it would create more & more international pressure.
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So I feel that we should make it clear to the Ukrainians, if you are
determined to resist, if they say they are, seemingly they, seemingly they
are trying to do so but not very effectively.
We would provide them with anti-tank weapons, hand-held anti-tank
weapons, hand-held rockets, weapons capable for use in urban, short range fighting. This is not an army of Ukraine for some
invasion of Russia. You don’t invade a
country as large as Russia with defensive weaponry. But if you have defensive weaponry and you
have access to it, & you know its arriving, you’re likely to resist. And
hence, that acts as a deterrent. And that in turn can permit them more
effective operations to terminate some of the violence that it is being
sponsored on the borders between Ukraine & Russia.
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That I think would help in any case to contain the risk & the
temptation to resolve this issue by force of arms. On the Russian side, in the context of a
mood, great
ecstasy over
the Crimean success which was quick and decisive and which encountered no
resistance, the temptation to seek its repetition can be quite strong and
appealing to a political leader who desperately needs a major success. But at
the same time, we have to engage in some exploration of possible arrangements
for a compromise outcome. especially if it becomes clear to the Russian and
Mr Putin that either destabilising Ukraine or taking it by force poses great
risks & may not be attainable.
That has to be accompanied by therefore in an effort in engage a
dialogue.
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What should be the formula for a possible compromise. I think it is relatively simple, in
fact. Ukraine can proceed with its
process, publically endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian
people, becoming part of Europe. But it’s a long process. The Turks have been promised that outcome
& they have been engaging in that process, already for 60 years. In other words it is not done very quickly.
Therefore the danger to Russia is not imminent and the … consequences are not
so destructive.
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00:35
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But at the same time,clarity that Ukraine is not be a member of
NATO. I think that is important for a
variety of geopolitical reasons. If
you look at the map, it is important from a pyschogical & strategic point
of view. Hence Ukraine will not be a
member of NATO, but by the same token, Russia has to understand that Ukraine will
not member of some mythical Eurasian Union, that President Putin is trying to
promote, on the basis of this new doctrine of a special position for Russia
& the world. And special claims outside of Russia viz a viz some of its
fellow natives. Ukraine will not a
member of the Eurasian Union but Ukraine can have a separate trade agreement
with Russia, particularly taking into account the mutually benefits of
the fact that certain forms of
exchange and trade are mutually beneficial. Agricultural products, for
example, from Ukraine to Russia. Industrial products that Russia needs and
now are being produced in Ukraine. Not many people realize that that some of
Russia’s best rockets, most of the engines for Russian civil aviation, and
some of the rockets used by the united states are produced in the Ukraine.
It's a profitable and successful industrial enterprise. And that, therefore,
should be continued under an arrangement whereby Ukraine and Russia have a
special treaty.
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I think something like this might actually at some point become
appealing. And it should be surfaced, but it should be surfaced in the
context of an open, not covert , but open action designed to convince the
Russians that any use of force will have negative but enduring consequences
for Russia itself. Not involving a
threat to Russia’s security, but involving rising costs of the assertion of
Russia's power at the cost of Ukrainian independence.
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00:39:00
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In my view in that context, NATO should also act somewhat more
assertively in reducing the insecurity of those NATO countries that border on
Russia and happen to have on the average about 25% of its population
constituted of Russian nationals. I
speak specifically of Estonia and Latvia.
America has committed its presence there. I would think it would be
very productive if addition to America and some leading states notably
Germany, France & Great Britain deployed some symbolic forces in these 3
countries, so that they’re there too, and not just Americans on a regular
basis, on a regular basis so that this would reaffirm the fact that NATO
stands, in the context of this problem, together. In international politics,
SYMBOLISM is as important as decisiveness, & symbolism can avert the
necessity for extreme measures.
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Given the current the consequences of the very massive expansion of
NATO, in the last several decades, to 28 members. It might be also appropriate in the light
of the ongoing experience that we are in the process of assimilating, to take
another look at the structure of NATO itself.
And I have in mind, a review of the historical paradox involved and it
is not much mentioned but potentially very important: Article 5.Article 5 is
the article which provides for the procedure that the alliance follows in in
undertaking a military response to an aggression directed at it in general or
at one or two or more of its members. You doubtless recall that article that
the decisions to engage in hostility by the alliance have to be unanimous,
which, in other words, means that a single country has a veto. It was the
united states that insisted on this provision when NATO was first formed. It
insisted it insisted on it in order to obtain popular support from it in the
American congress from the isolationist portions of the American body politic,
which feared that an alliance of this sort would violate American tradition
of no foreign entanglements. The argument was this gives America what it
needs to avoid a foreign entanglement.
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00:40:00
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Unfortunately, today, with 28 members, of varying degree of capacity
for participating in military action, & unfortunately, of some varying
degree of genuine political commitment to some of the security assumptions of
the alliance, the situation has become reversed. Some of the new allies that may be tempted
by some circumstances to invoke Article 5. Not entirely preventing NATO from
responding but I am convinced that would to happen, prolonged debates,
internal threats. The country was
trying to prevent NATO from acting, would be pursued to join. Or de facto,
taken out of the alliance, but I think that it would be wiser to review this
provision in a more patient atmosphere, in spite of the circumstances that
prevail today .
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One possible solution might be simply the adoption of the provision
of that there will be no veto right in the alliance for sustained, enduring
underperformers of jointly agreed commitments. Some members of NATO don’t
meet their commitments even by some remote approximation; just do not and
hence their membership in NATO is a free ride all together. Why should a member that doesn’t meet NATO
practically in total, then have the right to veto the other member’s right to
engage in collective self-defence. It’s
an anomaly & potential source of gridlock & confusion. As this crisis is gradually resolved, I
hope NATO will take another look at the issue & also look at the issue of
additional new members in NATO more critically. It doesn’t follow that a country, in whose
security NATO have an interest, has to be in NATO. NATO can have an interest
in its security, but without having it in NATO. And have a variety of understandings with
regards to how it might respond.
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00:43:00
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There is some talk of new members in the EU & Peharps of some
these will seek NATO membership. In
recent years some countries have obtained NATO membership while being
territorially remote from the possible conflicts on the East-West dividing line. I think more discretion here may be actually
beneficial & some reflection on this subject
Might in fact enhance NATO credibility & create some pressure on
those members who wish to be active members in NATO, to do more to meet the
commitment they have formally undertaken.
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Finally, I’m looking much further ahead, I think that one way or
another, with or without a compromise to a solution, Crimea will be become a
serious economic burden for Russia.
There is no way that the kind of economic activity in which Crimea has
been able to engage & quite profitably named as a major source of tourism
& visits & international liners on a large scale, coming into its
ports and foreign tourists engaging in trade, collection of souvenirs &
so forth, can be sustained, as long as the international community doesn’t
formally recognise the incorporation of Crimea into Russia. It means that the exploration of the
underwater resources, within Crimea’s territorial confines of the sea cannot
be undertaken by international companies because they’ll be subject ti suits
from a variety of interested parties.
In brief, Russia faces the prospect of the necessity of subsidizing on
a significant scale economic activity in Crimea to the benefit of its
citizens. Prices, consumer prices have
already risen three-fold since the incorporation of Crimea into Russia. This situation creates a potentially serious
liability for Russia, which already is in a weak economic position.
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Beyond that, there is the potential reality, which I think will .. .
the enduring reality of hostility to Russia on the basis of 40 million
people. Ukraine have not been under Russia historically and certainly, there
is no comparison & certainly, there is no comparison between its attitude
traditionally that is Russia and that of the poles next door. The poles have
repeatedly fought independence against Russia and have strong
Feelings & enduring on this subject. It’s becoming very intense & the entire
new generation of Ukrainians born in freedom and national sovereignty
reflected the strongest. Ukraine, therefore, will evolve not an enduring
problem for Russia in that respect, but the permanent laws of a huge swarth
of territory, the greatest loss of territory suffered by Russia in the course
of its imperial expansion. This may in
turn, eventually, begin to work against this new mythology regarding Russia’s
place & role in the world with which I started in my presentation. It may
be refuted by realities, & this is what I am increasingly hopeful for
that the new emerging Russia middle class, realising that the kind of
mythology that Putin has adopted & which a significant portion of the
less educated, more chauvinistic Russians have absorbed & embraced is a
road to nowhere. That the real place
in Russia as an important country is in Europe, as a major European country
& they will be reminded that imperative every time they look to the East
& ask themselves what does that mean for the future of Russia.
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00:47:03
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Thank you
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